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Reply to Paulus
REPLY TO ANDREAS L. PAULUS
CONSENSUS AS FICTION OF GLOBAL LAW
Andreas Paulus reminds us correctly that narratives "of a world of sov-
ereign states loosely cooperating in 'coalitions of the willing' no longer tell
the whole story."1 One of the achievements of the 20th century has been the
insertion of a vertical dimension within horizontal international law; a di-
mension created by the ICJ's Traction decision and the Vienna Convention
of the Law of Treaties, and within which we can observe "obligations arising
for states without or against their will."2 Any narrative that characterizes
these legal norms as a simple product of interstate consensus is particularly
thin if analysis focuses upon the genesis of international legal norms. Real
world processes are far more complex: states are only one of many actors
who seek to invoke the existence of international legal norms, and even the
ICJ accentuates generalizability rather than real-world uniformity:3
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as cus-
tomary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous
conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of cus-
tomary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States
should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances
of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally
have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the
existence of a new rule.4
One of the consequences of this development is, that Paulus' premise-
interstate consensus as the source of the legitimacy of law-is extremely
questionable in relation to international legal obligations. More importantly,
however, denying the legal dimensions of communication between non-state
actors likewise precludes a large number of social phenomena. In other
words, analysis is incomplete if one ignores the fact that:
[w]e are currently witnessing serious challenges to nation-state sov-
ereignty from three directions. First, supra-national norms and
structures (international human rights law, the WTO)
impinge upon sovereignty in unprecedented ways. The claim here is
not that states have been hermetically sealed up to this point; it is
1. Andreas Paulus, Commentary to Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner
The Legitimacy of International Law and the Role of the State, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1047 (2004).
2. Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without orAgainst Their Will, 241
RECUEIL DES COURS 197 (1993).
3. For a deconstructive analysis, see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA:
THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARGUMENT 6 passim (1989).
4. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 62, parE. 186 (June
27) [hereinafter Nicar. v. U.S.].
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rather that interference in state sovereignty is now being justified in
legal terms that carry increasing weight around the world. Second,
subnational groups are demanding (and receiving) increasing de-
grees of autonomy [ ... ] I will label the third dimension along
which sovereignty is under challenge as 'transnationalism'-the
presence within state borders of communities of non-nationals with
significant ties across borders.5
This cannot be said to result in the death of statehood; it can however be
said to reflect upon a fundamental change of social differentiation.6 Conse-
quently, we would like to answer Paulus' critique of the "functional
appropriateness perspective" with brief reference to the Yahoo! case named
in his response, which deals with cyberspace crimes.
CASE EXAMPLE: CYBERCRIME
Following the judgment of the Paris Grande Instance, Yahoo! is required
to deny French users access to auctions of Nazi memorabilia.7 The case
touches upon the fundamental issue of a universal right of access to digital
communication.
A. Functionality versus Territoriality
One of the most decisive responses of the international political system
to these challenges was the conclusion of a European Cybercrime Conven-
5. Alexander Aleinikoff, Sovereignty Studies in Constitutional Law:A Comment, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 197,201-02 (2000).
6. Thus, international law literature is increasingly concerned with differentiation of law
and politics. See, e.g., Uwe Kischel, The State as a Non-Unitary Actor: The Role of the Judicial
Branch in International Negotiations, 39 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 269 (2001). Anne-Marie
Slaughter underestimates the drama and polycontextuality of differentiation processes, applying a
form of network theory that restricts itself to an area of formal social organization and disregards a
spontaneous social sphere. This results in various democratic problems. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER,
A NEW WORLD ORDER 12 passim (2003).
7. T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Ordonnance de R6fr6, UEJF, LICRA v. Yahoo!, Inc., No.
00/05308, available at http://www.juriscom.net, translated at http://www.cdt.org/speech/
international/00 1120yahoofrance.pdf. This judgment confirms the earlier judgment of May 22,
2000, in which Yahoo was required to prevent access to Nazi memorabilia auction pages. T.G.I.
Paris, May 22, 2000, Ordonnance de R6fer6, UEJF, LICRA v. Yahoo!, No. 00/05308, 00/05309,
available at http://www.juriscom.net. For the resulting enforcement proceedings before US courts,
see Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1171
(N.D. Cal. 2001); Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F Supp. 2d
1181, 1192 (N.D. Ca. 2001) (both courts holding the French judgment unenforceable). For instruc-
tive discussion on this issue, see Marc H. Greenberg, A Return to Lilliput: The LICRA v. Yahoo!
Case and the Regulation of Online Content in the World Market, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1191
(2003).
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tion (Cybercrime Convention or Convention). The Cybercrime Convention
is the first international treaty that concerns itself with the particular charac-
teristics of offences that are committed deploying the internet and other
computer networks. In particular, it regulates copyright infringement, the
pursuit of child pornography, computer-related fraud and assaults on network
security. As enunciated in the preamble, its most important goal is the pro-
motion of a "common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society
against cybercrime, inter alia by adopting appropriate legislation and foster-
ing international co-operation." 9 A first appendix to the Convention concerns
itself with cases of racist or xenophobic propaganda.' 0 The most important
Convention rule that deals with the issue of the criminal use of the Internet
concerns the issue of jurisdiction. Article 22 of the Cybercrime Convention
foresees that:
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may
be necessary to establish jurisdiction over any offence established in
accordance with Articles 2-11 of this Convention, when the offence
is committed: (a) in its territory; or (b) on board a ship flying the
flag of that Party; or (c) on board an aircraft registered under the
laws of that Party; or (d) by one of its nationals, if the offence is
punishable under criminal law where it was committed or if the of-
fence is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State."
This provision is augmented through the creation of a limited obligation
to act in cases of overlapping jurisdictions: "When more than one Party
claims jurisdiction over an alleged offence established in accordance with
this Convention, the Parties involved shall, where appropriate, consult with a
view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution."' 2
Overlapping jurisdiction will be the rule rather than the exception, however,
8. Convention on Cybercrime, opened for signature Nov. 23, 2001, S. TREATY Doc. No.
108-11, Europ. T.S. No. 185, available at http://conventions.coe.intrFreaty/EN/
CadreListeTraites.htm [hereinafter Cybercrime Convention]. The Convention was adopted at the
109th session of the ministerial committee of the European Council on the 8th of November 2001
and presented for signature at the international conference on cybercrime on the 23rd November
2001. The convention is also open to non EU member states and has already been signed by more
than thirty states including the US, where President Bush sent it to the Senate on November 17,
2003.
9. Id. at pmbl.
10. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime Concerning the Criminalisation of
Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Systems, openedfor signa-
ture Jan. 28, 2003, Europ. T.S. No. 189, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
EN/CadreListeTraites.htm; The following entities helped with and can be referred to for the prepa-
ration process: European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC), Committee of Experts on the
Criminalisation Acts of Racist or Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Networks (PC-
RX).
11. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 8, at art. 22.
12 Id. at art. 22, para. 5
Reply to Paulus 1061Summer 2004]
Michigan Journal of International Law
since the territoriality principle stated within Article 22, Paragraph 1 (a) of
the Convention possesses a double character which can relate both to the
criminal act and to the occurrence of illegal consequences. This is also made
clear in the explanatory protocol on Article 22:
Paragraph 1 litera a) is based upon the principle of territoriality.
Each Party is required to punish the commission of crimes estab-
lished in this Convention that are committed in its territory. For
example, a Party would assert territorial jurisdiction if both the per-
son attacking a computer system and the victim system are located
within its territory, and where the computer system attacked is
within its territory, even if the attacker is not.13
As regards the limited obligation to act detailed in Article 22, Paragraph
5, the explanatory protocol declares that:
In the case of crimes committed by use of computer systems, there
will be occasions in which more than one Party has jurisdiction over
some or all of the participants in the crime. For example, many vi-
rus attacks, frauds and copyright violations committed through use
of the Internet target victims located in many States. In order to
avoid duplication of effort, unnecessary inconvenience for wit-
nesses, or competition among law enforcement officials of the
States concerned, or to otherwise facilitate the efficiency or fairness
of the proceedings, the affected Parties are to consult in order to de-
termine the proper venue for prosecution. In some cases, it will be
most effective for the States concerned to choose a single venue for
prosecution; in others, it may be best for one State to prosecute
some participants, while one or more other States pursue others. Ei-
ther result is permitted under this paragraph. Finally, the obligation
to consult is not absolute, but is to take place 'where appropriate.'
Thus, for example, if one of the Parties knows that consultation is
not necessary (e.g., it has received confirmation that the other Party
is not planning to take action), or if a Party is of the view that con-
sultation may impair its investigation or proceeding, it may delay or
decline consultation.
14
Even the most cursory of reviews confirms that this attempt to coordi-
nate national legal orders by means of the application of the territoriality
principle will not solve the conflicts problem. Accordingly, alternative solu-
tions are sought within political consultation mechanisms, or a pactum de
13. Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 8,2001, art. 22, para. 233, Europ.
T.S. No. 185.
14. Id. at para. 239.
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negotiando. Nonetheless, and with simple regard to the existence of more
than thirty signatory states to the Convention, the functionality of such a so-
lution might be doubted. In addition, however, qualms might be expressed
about the effectiveness of this political process in view of the fact that over
150 States within the international community are not party to the Conven-
tion. The difficulties of creating appropriate global legal norms for
cybercrime are further increased since the claim that the Convention is codi-
fying common legal norms of international law is difficult to justify. The
effort to avoid much deplored visions of the neutralization of tension be-
tween freedom and security through the proverbial "race to the bottom" will
require, above all, the development of transnational norms that anticipate the
potential global effects that local and functional legal decisions may have. As
we have described, judicial instances must conceive of themselves as a part
of a transnational legal order and shift their horizons above nationally struc-
tured normative orders to include a transnational law-making process within
which NGOs, international organizations and spontaneously coordinated
societal actors are attempting to establish the legitimacy of global law with
reference to a variety of sources.
B. Polycentric Jus Non Dispositivum versus Uniform lus Cogens
All such actors seek to expound specific principles and to universalise
values. The declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace reproduces the
constitutional-political pathos of national constitutional acts and declaims to
the:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and
steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. [ ... ] the
global social space we are building to be naturally independent of
the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to
rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have
true reason to fear.'5
Similarly, the European Council's Cybercrime Convention identifies as
its leading principles:
the need to ensure a proper balance between the interests of law en-
forcement and respect for fundamental human rights, as enshrined
in the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 1966 United Na-
tions International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as
other applicable international human rights treaties, which reaffirm
15. John P. Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Feb. 9, 1996, at
http://www.dtext.com/hache/indep.html.
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the right of everyone to hold opinions without interference, as well
as the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, and the rights concerning the respect for privacy.
6
The principles evoked here do not form a part of the ius cogens in the
sense established by Article 53 of the Vienna Convention. If the argument is
really one of whether all rights identified within the "International Bill of
Rights' ' 17 could or should be dignified with this status, then the tense rela-
tionship between the hierarchical and horizontal nature of the transnational
law-making process-a tension which Paulus also recognizes"-would sim-
ply be resolved in favor of the hierarchical principle. Political consensus
upon such an extension of ius cogens could never be achieved; as is well
known the principle's existing constellation has met with much national op-
position from influential states such as France. Amongst other things, the
dominant skepticism concerns any expansion in the jurisdiction and applica-
bility of a provision, Article 53 Vienna Convention, which nonetheless-and
this is emphatically confirmed-is seen as serving a useful role within inter-
national law and within the arena of international human rights, and which
furthermore forms one of the most important constitutionalizing elements
within this regime.' 9
A very different issue is the reference to global values in legal argument.
The ICJ has referred to global values on countless occasions.20 The limits to
law are not jurisdictional, but are rather to be found within references to val-
ues that lie "'above all fluctuating validity claims' and which provide law
with 'a level of meaning [... ] upon which necessary foundations-in mod-
em terms, peaceful cohabitation-are formed.' ,2' Recognition within the
doctrine of the international community2 for common value references is
thus, at least in part, correct, particularly since the existence of an "Interna-
tional Bill of Rights," comprising both international human rights covenants
16. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 8, at pmbl.
17. The three principal instruments which are deemed the "International Bill of Rights" are:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948); The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171 (en-
tered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
18. Paulus, supra note 1.
19. Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Die Emergenz der Globalverfassung, 63 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLA NDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 717, 737 (2003).
20. For references to ICJ jurisprudence, see Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensur-
ing the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century General Course on Public International
Law, 281 RECUEIL DES COURs 46 (1999).
21. NIKLAs LUHMANN, DAs RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 527 (1993) (our translation).
22. For a comprehensive discussion, see ANDREAS PAULUS, DIE INTERNATIONALE
GEMEINSCHAFT IM VOLKERRECHT (2001).
[Vol. 25:1059
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and the Declaration of Human Rights, demonstrates that discussion on the
universality versus the relativity of values is misconceived; after all, the mer-
est glance at the rights catalogue reveals that an overwhelming number of
international legal subjects give international legal recognition to such posi-
tive values.23 Nonetheless, the work of the law only really begins at this point
and the question of universal values and the human rights catalogue must be
posed in a different manner; to what (rather than simply to themselves) do
such values refer? 4 The only certainty is that positive values (freedom, peace
and equality) take preference over their negations (lack of freedom, war and
inequality). Consensus upon an accepted hierarchy of values is just as elu-
sive as is a mutual rejection of values, with the consequence that reference to
26a universal value community offers us little assistance. The essential para-
dox of the social contract construction is reproduced within rights
catalogues-the diffuse formula that "the rights of one party form obliga-
tions for another party" is now given positive form in clauses such as:
Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and
full development of his personality is possible. In the exercise of his
rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limita-
tions as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others
and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and
the general welfare in a democratic society. These rights and free-
doms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations. 27
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or
reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or
of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.
23. On the consensus on values, see Alfred Verdross, Die Wertgrundlagen des Vlkerrechts, 4
ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 129, 139 (1953-1954).
24. NIKLAS LUHMANN, GIBT ES IN UNSERER GESELLSCHAFT NOCH UNVERZICHTBARE
NORMEN? 18 (1993).
25. On the problem created by the fact that different observers ascribe different meaning to
the same value, see Charles Chaumont, Cours Ggneral de Droit International Public, 129 RECUEIL
DES COURs 335, 344 (1970).
26. On the troublesome consequences for the "International Bill of Rights," see Surya
Prakash Sinha, The Axiology of the International Bill of Rights, I PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 21 (1989).
27. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 17, at art. 29.
28. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 17, at art. 19, para. 3.
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Rights catalogues will thus have little to say in cases of value conflict;
that is, in exactly those cases in which values must prove their practical rele-
vance:" they loose their directive value at exactly the moment when it is
required most. And the same is true in reverse: judgments are always, and
only, necessary where values give rise to conflicting demands, such that
there are not rules for judgments.0 Lawyers fondly refer to "value balanc-
ing'" and "practical concordat" in such cases.) These are formulas,
however, that can only retain their unity to the exact degree that they do not
divulge their own consequences and do not reveal what they do not say."
Their obfuscating potential is only strengthened through concepts such as the
"margin of appreciation," 4 which is designed to reflect cultural peculiarities
and widen discretion.35 In order to balance values, to promote practical con-
cordats and to reach decisions in cases of conflict, we thus require a legal
system in which reference to values may very well symbolize seeming sub-
servience to a fictitious unity of the heterogeneous, but in reality only
stabilizes behavioral expectations, not through the chimera of unity, but
through a distinction of the legal from the non-legal:
[T]he distinction between system and environment replaces the tra-
ditional emphasis on the identity of guiding principles or values.
Differences, not identities, provide the possibility of perceiving and
processing information. The sharpness of the difference between
system and environment may be more important than the degree of
system integration (whatever this means), because morphogenetic
29. Surya Prakash Sinha, Legal Polycentricity, in LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY: CONSEQUENCES
OF PLURALISM IN LAW 31 (Hanne Petersen & Henrik Zahle eds., 1995).
30. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 20.
31. ROBERT ALEXY, THEORIE DER GRUNDRECHTE 138 (Suhrkamp 1994) (1985).
32. KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZUGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND para. 72 (20th ed. 1995). For a reformulation of this thought from an international
law perspective, see Dieter Blumenwitz, Souveranitat-Gewaltverbot-Menschenrecht. Eine
vblkerrechtliche Bestandsaufnahme nach Abschlu3 des nicht-mandatierten NATO-Einsatzes in Ex-
Jugoslawien, in POLrTISCHE STUDIEN 30 (1999).
33. Niklas Luhmann, Grundwerte als Zivilreligion, 3 SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKL.XRUNG 293
(Niklas Luhmann ed., 1981); LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 21.
34. Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European
Court of Human Rights, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 240 (1996); ANNETTE RUPP-SWIENTY, DIE DOKTRIN VON DER MARGIN OF
APPRECIATION IN DER RECHTSPRECHUNG DES EUROPAISCHEN GERICHTSHOFS FOR
MENSCHENRECHTE (1999).
35. Even the UN Human Rights Commission, in accordance with the ICCPR takes partial
note of this formula developed by the European Commission of Human Rights. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 17, at art. 28, para. 1, especially with regard to
the interpretation of the human rights obligation of individual states, see Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of
Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 INT'L L. POL. 844 (1999).
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processes use differences, not goals, values, or identities, to build up
36emergent structures.
The "legal validity" of values within the global community is only ob-
servable to the degree that these values are distilled into legal operations. In
other words, fundamental principles and human rights of the global commu-
nity are therefore neither a consensual a priori, nor an accepted derivation
from natural law, nor do they have the character of Kelsen's Grundnorm.
Instead, they are legal artifacts to which law reflexively refers. Thus, it is the
law which decides the undecidable: the validity of values; along with colli-
sions; concordances and heterogeneities between them: as well as the
compatibilization of dissent.3 7 By virtue of the internal differentiation of
global law, however, conflicts judgments are always taken and "practical
concordats" always concluded from the perspective of a specific legal re-
gime. The notion of "liberty" within the context of the Internet or the ICCPR
implies-even though we might regret this from a moral perspective-
something very different from the "liberty of trade" evoked in the context of
the WTO regime. Seen within a "regimes" perspective, the issue is not one
of deciding upon conflicts between different values, but is rather a matter of
maintaining compatibility between the different concepts of liberty found
within different regimes. Thus, the reference to a "cohesive glue,' 38 or indeed
to "overlapping consensus"3 9 underestimates the fact that the issue is not a
matter of factual consensus within the international community or the inter-
net community. Instead, fragmented processes of norm creation each work
with their own visions of consensus, possess their own textual references that
are applied differently in different contexts and feign commensurability of
the incommensurate through the re-entry of external rationalities.
C. Constitutional Pluralism v. Unity of Global Law
Such a polycentric view of global society does not, however, place the
establishment of a system of global law in doubt. The application of a com-
mon legal code stabilizes borders of the legal and non-legal and the most
important task of global constitutionalism is that of maintaining the
36. Niklas Luhmann, The World Society as a Social System, in ESSAYS ON SELF-REFERENCE
175, 179 (Niklas Luhmann ed., 1990).
37. See Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Prozedurale Rationalitat-Steigerung der Legitimationsfahigkeit
oder der Leistungsfdhigkeit des Rechtssystems?, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FuR RECHTSSOZIOLoGIE 265 (1986);
see also the description in MARCELO NEVES, VERFASSUNG UND POSITIVITAT DES RECHTS IN DER
PERIPHEREN MODERNE: EINE THEORETISCHE BETRACHTUNG UND EINE INTERPRETATION DES FALLS
BRASILIEN 42 (1992).
38. Christian Tomuschat, International Law as the Constitution of Mankind, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ON THE EVE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: VIEWS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION 37, 45 (1997).
39. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133 (1996).
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independence of law as against politics, the economic, and religion. Inter-
legality poses a challenge because "[t]he world community swarms with
myriad legal orders (in today's parlance we would call them 'sub-systems');
they do not live by themselves, each in its own area, but intersect and overlap
with each other."40 In other words, global law can only be recognized as frag-
mented because the legal regimes use the same code. At the same time,
internal differentiation within the global law increasingly occurs upon func-
tional rather than territorial lines. With regard to inter-legality,
constitutionalization means that each regime is reflexively oriented to its
own social environment and in this way incorporates an altera pars. Respon-
siveness can only be secured by means of the re-entry of external
rationalities. Problems that arise are clearly similar to those found in the re-
lationship of national law to international law within the Westphalian system
of States. This relationship between State and international law is similarly
paradoxical and the monistic, dualistic and the qualified dualistic doctrines
developed within international law theory cannot end the circularity created
by the fact that, on the one hand, States constitute international law, whilst,
on the other, international law constitutes States.'
When Paulus makes the point that it is "a matter of perspective whether
one interprets the use of norms from other systems as an autonomous incor-
poration or as evidence for the existence of one common system, ' 2 he is
referring to the core problem of regime pluralism. Each conflict can only be
settled within the context of its own entanglement. Even were it possible to
clearly state that the international legal regime, with the ICJ at its center,
possesses secondary rules of recognition in H.L.A. Hart's terms and is con-
stitutionalized to the degree that one can identify the emergence of a global
political constitution, 3 we must nonetheless recognize that the international
law perspective is but one of many. As per Marti Koskenniemi:
Likewise, statements by the Presidents of the ICJ are to be seen as
defensive moves in a changing political environment. '[S]pecialized
courts [... ] are inclined to favour their own disciplines.' Judge Guil-
laume stated in 2000. This is true-but it applies equally to his own
Court. If the Presidents argue that other tribunals should request ad-
visory opinions from their Court, then surely this should be read as
an effort to ensure position at the top of the institutional hierarchy.
But if the conflict has to do with preferences for future develop-
ment, then it is unsurprising that not one body has expressed interest
40. Antonio Cassese, Remarks on Scelle's Theory of "Role Splitting" (dddoublementfonc-
tionnel) in International Law, I EUR. J. INT'L L. 210, 211 (1990).
41. Fischer-Lescano, supra note 19.
42. Paulus, supra note 1.
43. Fischer-Lescano, supra note 19.
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in submitting its jurisdiction to scrutiny by the ICJ [.. .] Today's in-
stitutional struggles do not favour the interests of sovereign equality
represented by 'generalist' lawyer diplomats."
Within constitutional pluralism-and this point cannot be overstressed-
there is no unitary center, no hierarchical higher instance. ICANN and other
fora of global law make divergent decisions on cybercrime and the constitu-
tionalization of each regime must establish a mutual interplay between
autonomous social and autonomous legal processes.4 These conditions alone
allow for the phenomenon of constitutional duplication, which is characteris-
tic of structural coupling and which precludes the widely held concept that
takes as its point of departure the notion that a unitary concept of constitu-
tion acts as a melting pot for legal and social orders. The constitution is
simply only ever a node or hook between two real-world processes: from the
legal viewpoint, reality entails a process of legal norm production that is
necessarily enmeshed with the fundamental structures of the social system;
from the perspective of the constituted social system, reality entails a process
of the creation of the fundamental structures of social order that simultane-
46ously informs law and is, for its part, given normative direction by law.
Structural coupling restricts both systems'-legal process and social proc-
ess-ability to mutually influence one another. The overpowering of one by
the other is prevented, mutual irritations are concentrated within narrowly
restricted and often institutionalized paths of influence.
D. Democracy Without A Demos versus
Cosmopolitical Homogeneity
Obviously, there are limits to the democratic theory argument that only
those norms created by means of interstate consensus should have global
validity. Legal validity cannot even be secured for the most fundamental of
human rights, such as rights guarding against apartheid, slavery and geno-
cide: not all states are members of the Genocide Convention, not all states-
France springs to mind -agreed to art. 53 of the Vienna Convention that
lends validity to the notion of jus cogens, whilst the most important
44. Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern
Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 553,562 (2002); see also Martti Koskenniemi, International Law
in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, Speech at the Inauguration Conference of the European
Society of International Law at Florence, at 4 (May 14, 2004)(on file with authors).
45. On the structural coupling of law with other social systems, see Gunther Teubner, Idio-
syncratic Production Regimes: Co-evolution of Economic and Legal Institutions in the Varieties of
Capitalism, in THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURAL ENTITIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY
161 (Michael Wheeler et al. eds., 2002); LUHMANN, supra note 21, at 440.
46. Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitu-
tional Theory? in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (Christian Joerges et
al. eds., forthcoming 2004).
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addressee of the ban upon apartheid-the South African Republic of the
1970s and 1980s-remained fierce in its opposition to it. Even when interna-
tional law is viewed in isolation, democracy and a transnational legal order
are still trapped within a circular relationship which international law doc-
trine attempts to address either:
" by arguing for the return of the post-westphalian system to a co-
ordinatory form of international law;
4
1
* by demanding an intensification in the cooperative character of
the international law of states;
48
* by means of a reduction of international legal process to a notion
of democratic states as law-makers;49 or
" through the postulation of a cosmopolitan democracy, ° or even a
global republic."
Our starting point is that the most powerful political actors are no longer
in a position to control global development of a law. Global regimes reject
an external political determination with the consequence that any analytical
perspective that restricts itself to a global social contract between States is
not in a position to take note of the full range of problems posed by the glob-
alization of law:52 in other words, if global law is reduced to include only
those legal developments that take place in consensual statal proceedings,
then a multitude of social phenomena are excluded. An appropriate analysis
of the problem thus falls victim to the leading goal of normative unity, and
whilst this might possibly facilitate the retention of an ideal unitary interna-
tional law legitimated by statal consensus, it nonetheless represents a
cognitive reductive dissonance. Obviously, we agree with the warning sup-
plied by Paulus that "[t]he move from territoriality to functionality should
not be accompanied by a move from democracy to technocracy." 3 His faith,
47. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413
(1983); Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenf'rde, Die Zukunft politischer Autonomie, in
STAAT, NATION, EUROPA: STUDIEN ZUR STAATSLEHRE, VERFASSUNGSTHEORIE UND
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 103; 116 (Ernst Wolfgang Bockenf6rde ed., 1999).
48. See Paulus, supra note 1.
49. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L.
503 (1995).
50. DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER 278 (1995); OTFRIED HoFFE,
DEMOKRATIE IM ZEITALTER DER GLOBALISIERUNG 267 (2d ed. 2002); WELTREPUBLIK:
GLOBALISIERUNG UND DEMOKRATIE (Stefan Gosepath & Jean-Christophe Merle eds., 2002).
51. For a useful summary, see Armin von Bogdandy, Demokratie, Globalisierung, Zukunft
des Vlkerrechts-eine Bestandsaufnahme, 63 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLXNDISCHES OFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT 853 (2003).
52. See the critiques in GUSTAV RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 185 (Studienausgabe, Ralf
Dreier ed., C.F. MUller 1999) (1932).
53. Paulus, supra note 1.
1070 [Vol. 25:1059
Reply to Paulus
however, in the democratic nature of the international law-making process
still strikes a false note.4 The majority of states that are party to the interna-
tional law-making process are not founded within notions of democratic
transmission. Accordingly, normative demands, such as those made by Anne
Marie-Slaughter, that democracies should be given a privileged space within
the system of the international community also set a false accent because it
rests upon strategies of exclusion and marginalization.55 The suggestion that
aristocratic networks or coordinated executives within international organisa-
tions such as the UN, WTO, IMF, etc.,16 might take on the role of supplying
global law with legitimacy is similarly misplaced.
Returning to the Cybercrime Convention: the Convention was worked
out within the arena of European Council proceedings following the Ministe-
rial Committee's early recommendation that the harmonisation of national
provisions was necessary.57 The US was granted observer status early on in
proceedings and a common EU position was already established in 1999.58
The Legal Committee of the Parliament Assembly gave its opinion on the
final draft convention on April 10, 2001. Two weeks later, on April 24, the
15th draft was laid directly before the European Council's Parliamentary
Assembly.59 Despite occasionally very powerful critiques from technical and
data protection experts only one amendment was adopted. 0 The draft was
54. See the critiques in the following: B. S. CHIMNI, International Institutions Today: An
Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004); Sonja Buckel, Empire oder
Rechtspluralismus? Recht im Globalisierungsdiskurs, 36 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 177 (2003).
55. Gerry Simpson, Two Liberalisms, 12 Euk. J. INT'L. L. 537 (2001).
56. Philip Allott, The Emerging International Aristocracy, 35 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL. 309
(2003).
57. Concerning Problems of Criminal Procedure Law Connected with Information Technol-
ogy, Council of Europe Recommendation No. R(95)13 (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on
September 11, 1995 at meeting 543 of the Ministers' Deputies), available athttp://www.privacy.org/
pi/ind_orgs/coe/infotech_1995.html.
58. 1999/364/JHA: Common Position of 27 May 1999 adopted by the Council on the basis
of Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union, on negotiations relating to the Draft Convention on
Cyber Crime held in the Council of Europe, 1999 O.J. (L 142) 1-2.
59. Council of Europe Debate on the Freedom of Expression and Information in the Media
of Europe, EUR. PARL. Ass. DEB. 2001 Ordinary Sess., 10th Sitting (April 24,2001), at 380, para. 6.
60. Sections of this are documented by the Center for Democracy and Technology. See
Comments of the Center for Democracy and Technology on the Council of Europe Draft "Conven-
tion on Cybercrime" (Dec. 11, 2000), at http://www.cdt.org/intemational/cybercrime/
001211 cdt.shtml; Global Internet Liberty Campaign Member Letter on Council of Europe Conven-
tion on Cyber-Crime Version 24.2 (Dec. 12, 2000), at http://www.gilc.org/privacy/
coe-letter-1200.html; Comments of the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic Privacy
Information Center and Privacy International on Draft 27 of the Proposed CoE Convention on Cy-
bercrime (June 7, 2001), at www.privacyintemational.org/issues/cybercrime/coe/
ngo_letter_601 .htm. Here is at least one critique of this issue:
In the last few years, after considerable international debate over surveillance, privacy
and electronic commerce, the use of encryption has been liberalized, except in a few au-
thoritarian governments such as China and Russia. Article 19.4 is a step backwards by
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reviewed for a final time by the European Committee on Crime Problems
and approved at the next plenary session. The Convention was finally
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on November 8,2001. Since non-EU
members can at best only be given observer status within these closed Euro-
pean circles, it is difficult to claim that these proceedings contributed to the
creation of global democratic legitimacy. And the opinion of the Centre for
Data Protection of the German State of Schleswig-Holstein was correct in its
critique that:
The European Councils draft convention on cybercrime mentioned
in the Commission notification was drafted without the transparency
and participation of democratically legitimated decision-makers that
is necessary in this highly sensitive policy area.6 '
The democratic deficit within the international community and the law-
making mechanism of international law is thus currently as great, if not far
greater, than the deficit found within global regimes which, for their part, do
not represent particular territorial groupings. As a consequence, the chal-
lenge is one of ensuring that exclusionary tendencies of regimes will be
combated. On the one hand, the universalizing potential of the regime needs
to be liberated. On the other, steps must be taken to ensure that such regimes
are reflexively connected with their social environments. Such a constitu-
tionalization might facilitate the liberation of the yet to be exhausted
democratic potential of these regimes. The constitutional challenge within
each regime would be the normative securing of the duality of social auton-
omy within sub-systems, or the securing of a dynamic between spontaneous
and organised realms. The matter would be one of stabilizing and institu-
tionally securing the spontaneous/organized distinction. In the Internet, a
distinction between spontaneous public realms (in a manner similar to the
fundamental rights sections of political and market constitutions) and highly
formalized organizational realms (comparable with state administrative law
seemingly requiring that countries adopt laws that can force users to provide their en-
cryption keys and the plain text of the encrypted files.
Id. at para. C.
61. Unabhiingiges Landeszentrum ftir Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein: Sichere
Informationsgesellschaft, Bekampfung der Computerkriminalitat und Datenschutz, Stellungnahme
zurMitteilung der Kommission KOM(2000) 890, zugleich Kritik des Entwurfs einer "Convention on
Cyber-Crime" des Europarats, (PC-CY (2000) Draft No. 25 Rev.), at http://www.
datenschutzzentrum.de/material/themen/cybercri/cyberkon.htm, para. 5 (our translation). See also
Report concerning the public hearing of interested parties on the issues addressed in the Communi-




or company law), would stabilize each realm within its own rationality, and
would conceive of its major task the elaboration of mutual controls.62
E. Summary
The unity of public and private regimes would be fostered within global
law. The common normative vision is the re-specification of political consti-
tutional law. In each internal realm the duality of the spontaneous public
sphere and a highly formalized organizational sphere needs to be secured.
This reflects the fact that the major threat to global society is posed by the
particularistic and expansive tendencies of highly refined rationality spheres
and that the simple substitution of the concept of the pars pro toto of politics
by a totum pro parte is an inadequate response. Rather, a more appropriate
strategy would be one of paying adequate attention to strange loops: If world
politics does not manage to represent world society as a whole, and if it
seems to be less and less the political system that puts the decisive conse-
63quences on societal reality, but other, non-state actors, then the response to
these challenges becomes a matter of constitutionalizing self-contained pub-
lic and private regimes.
ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO & GUNTHER TEUBNER
(Frankfurt am Main)
62. Teubner, supra note 46; see also Andrea Ottolia & Dan Wielsch, Mapping the Informa-
tion Environment: LegalAspects ofDigitalization and Modularization, 6 YALE J.L. TECH. 174, 199
(2004), at http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/yjolt/files/20032004Issue/Ottolia&Wielsch.pdf.
63. See Armin Nassehi, Politik des Staates oder Politik der Gesellschaft? Kollektivitat als
Problemformel des Politischen, in THEORIE DER POLITIK: NIKLAs LUHMANNS POLITISCHE
SOZIOLOGIE 38 (Kai-Uwe Hellman et al. eds., Suhrkamp 2002); Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of
the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law? 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 447
(1993).
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